There’s a big problem with Bitcoin transactions from a business perspective that no one often talks about. Let’s say a business pays a supplier in BTC from a reused wallet address. They can actually look beyond the invoice.
Right now, while you’re reading this, a competitor can open a block explorer and see who you paid in Bitcoin for your last deal — how much, when, and to which counterparty. Transaction tracing isn’t a problem for people with something to hide. It’s a standing business risk: treasury movements, partner relationships, and deal flow sit open to anyone willing to spend an afternoon following the trail.
The reflex is to assume this exposure starts on-chain, at the moment you sign a transaction. It doesn’t. In July 2026, researchers from KU Leuven’s DistriNet group tested 85 of the most popular browser-extension wallets and found that the wallets themselves leak enough to fingerprint and follow their users — before a single transaction is ever signed.
The wallet pings an outside server to display a balance, and that request already carries the address in the clear. No exploit is involved; the extensions behave exactly as they were built to. Across all 85, the fingerprinting weakness alone reaches 36 wallets, which account for roughly 82% of the installs studied — the subgroup every later number in this section is measured against.
And this holds even for the honest ones. Andy Greenberg spent a decade as crypto crime’s most careful chronicler, reporting on the hackers, dealers, and launderers who treated the blockchain as a hiding place — and watching investigators pull them out of it one by one. It took him ten years to see how far from untraceable Bitcoin actually was. The ledger that was supposed to protect them was the record that convicted them.
The false confidence runs in one direction — the people who assume they’ve done enough to stay private are mostly the ones who never had anything to hide: a donor whose entire giving history is now public, a journalist whose sources can be inferred from a payment trail, the B2B counterparty above.
Almost every layer of this happens to you, not by you. The rest of this piece maps the exposure in full — and marks the one link that was ever yours to write.
What Leaks From a Wallet Beyond the Transaction Itself
A crypto wallet can reveal information before you even make a transaction. To show your balance, a browser wallet usually contacts outside servers and sends them your wallet address. Researchers from KU Leuven tested 85 popular browser-extension wallets, representing around 35 million Chrome Web Store installs. They found that 36 wallets — covering roughly 82% of the installs studied — could be identified and followed this way.
Seventeen wallets, covering about 23 million installs, could also expose links between different addresses belonging to the same user. In 22 of the 36 affected wallets, websites could still read an address even after the user revoked access and restarted the browser.
There is another problem. Websites can often detect which wallet extensions someone has installed without the user connecting a wallet at all. Researchers also found that 23 of the 36 affected wallets could leak an address through content loaded from another website, without the user clicking anything.
Most wallet providers contacted by the researchers did not treat this as a serious bug. Coinbase Wallet, Coin98 and Hana made changes, while others including MetaMask, Rabby and OKX did not. The researchers also tested 30 decentralized apps and found that only 11 properly revoked wallet access when users clicked “disconnect” or logged out.
Once an address becomes visible, the public blockchain provides the rest of the picture.
Blockchain-analysis companies look for transaction patterns that suggest several addresses belong to the same person or organization.
For example, if several wallets repeatedly send funds between each other or interact in similar ways, software can group them together. One known address can therefore lead analysts to several others.
This happens at enormous scale. By mid-2026, Chainalysis said it had grouped more than 1 billion blockchain addresses into over 134,000 identified entities.
Moving funds between blockchains does not necessarily break the trail either. Analysts can follow assets through bridges between networks. Using a decentralized exchange does not automatically hide the transaction, because swaps are still recorded publicly on the blockchain.
The result is fairly simple: a wallet address may look like a random string of characters, but once enough activity is connected around it, it can become a detailed financial profile.
There are real examples of this working. After the Colonial Pipeline ransomware attack in 2021, US investigators followed Bitcoin through several wallets and recovered about $2.3 million of the $4.4 million ransom payment.
Helix: The Mechanism You Can’t Fool by Trying to Hide
In the early years of Bitcoin, Helix was very popular in the darknet markets. It built to do one thing: make Bitcoin untraceable. Larry Dean Harmon ran it as a tumbler from 2014 to 2017, mixing customers’ coins to obscure where their funds came from, and he marketed the output as “clean” bitcoin. The entire model was concealment. Nothing about the service existed except to break the link between a coin’s origin and its destination.
Some 354,468 BTC, about $311M at the time, passed through it. The mixing changed what the trail looked like; it did not remove the trail. Every coin still left a permanent mark on the blockchain, one that couldn’t be altered or deleted after the fact.
Harmon took a 2.5% commission on each swap, and that commission went where every other coin went: onto the chain, permanently. The cut he skimmed to run a concealment service became the record that led back to the operator of it. The one service designed from the ground up to erase the trail wrote its owner into the trail it couldn’t erase.
How a Wallet Trail Gets Tied to a Real Person
Helix shows that moving Bitcoin around does not necessarily erase the trail. But following the money is only half the job. Analysts still need to connect those wallet addresses to a real person or business.
That usually happens when funds touch a regulated exchange. Exchanges know which deposit addresses belong to their customers and hold identity records through KYC checks. If investigators trace Bitcoin to one of those addresses, they can request the account details through legal process.
That single connection can reveal far more than one transaction. If blockchain analysis has already linked several addresses as likely belonging to the same owner, identifying one of them can put a name on the whole group. The exchange may only know about the address that touched its platform, but the earlier analysis can connect it to the rest.
Sometimes no legal request is needed. People and businesses regularly publish wallet addresses themselves — on websites, donation pages, Telegram chats or public profiles. Once an address is openly tied to a name, its past transactions are also visible.
For businesses, this creates a basic privacy problem. A supplier payment can expose previous payments, treasury movements and other counterparties. Because blockchain transactions are permanent and timestamped, one identified wallet can make years of activity easier to reconstruct.
Where Blockchain Tracing Can Get It Wrong
That does not mean blockchain analysis is always correct.
The systems used to connect wallets rely heavily on patterns and probability. They can produce false positives and false negatives: innocent activity can be flagged, while suspicious activity can be missed.
One problem is transaction history. Bitcoin can pass through many owners. If coins previously moved through a mixer or a wallet considered risky, a later owner can inherit that suspicion despite having nothing to do with the earlier activity.
One documented P2P buyer had an account frozen because the Bitcoin he received had passed through a mixer before he owned it.
For exchanges and other regulated businesses, these mistakes have practical costs. A false alert can freeze a legitimate customer’s funds and create a compliance and support problem.
There are also limits to what tracing companies can see. Privacy-focused cryptocurrencies such as Monero remain much harder to follow. Investigations can also stop when funds reach exchanges in jurisdictions that refuse to cooperate.
Even the biggest blockchain analytics companies have made major corrections. In early 2025, Chainalysis reduced its estimate of crypto stolen by North Korea during the previous year from $1 billion to $660.5 million — a correction of more than $300 million after several hacks were reassessed.
The reliability of these systems has also been challenged in court. Defense teams in cases including Bitcoin Fog and Tornado Cash have questioned how much weight should be placed on analysis produced by proprietary software that outsiders cannot fully inspect.
That scrutiny matters because Chainalysis is also a major US government contractor. Independent reporting based on federal records found it had received more than $93.2 million in government awards.
The biggest risk from a wrong result falls on innocent users. A mistaken link can freeze an account. In countries with weaker protections, the same tracing tools can expose donors, journalists or people funding political opposition. Blockchain tracing can reveal a great deal, but the result should never be treated as automatically correct.
The One Part of the Trail Users Can Still Control
Most of the exposure described above happens outside the user’s control. Wallets can leak addresses before a transaction is made. Blockchain analysis can connect multiple addresses, and regulated exchanges can tie those wallets to a real identity through KYC records.
The part users can still control is the direct link between sender and recipient. When one wallet pays another, that connection is written permanently on-chain and can later reveal counterparties, treasury movements, and business relationships.
ChangeNOW introduced Private Transfers to remove that direct connection. The feature routes a payment through a separate one-time address, so the recipient does not receive funds directly from the sender. This breaks the visible sender-to-recipient path without claiming to make the wider transaction anonymous.
Other exposure remains. Wallet metadata can still leak, blockchain analysis can still follow surrounding activity, and AML checks still apply at the deposit, transfer and payout stages.
For API partners, Private Transfers is an optional feature within the existing transfer infrastructure. It uses the same API key and fee model and does not require a separate product or integration. Its purpose is narrower: remove the one visible link users can actually choose not to create.
Conclusion
Return to where this started. Andy Greenberg spent years believing the blockchain hid the people using it and came out the other side with the opposite conclusion: “it took me a decade to realize how opposite of untraceable Bitcoin really was.” That is the ground the whole piece stands on. Untraceability, as a total property, doesn’t exist. The wallet leaks, the chain records, the cluster resolves to a name.
That’s the position worth holding for a partner. Not anonymity, which a decade of traced coins shows to be a story rather than a property, but a clear account of which layer closes and which stays open. Private Transfers removes the one link that was the user’s to create.
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